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FOR

ENTERTAINMENT PURPOSES
OR

AD MAJOREM DEI GLORIAM:
Televangelism in the Marketplace of Ideas
For we brought nothing into this world,
and it is certain we can carry nothing out.
And having food and raiment let us be
therewith content. But they that will be
richfall into temptation and a snare, and
into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which
drown men in destruction and perdition.
Forthe love of money is the root of all evil:
which while some coveted after, they have
erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows.'
-1 Timothy 6:3-10

1. INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe, a terminally ill homemaker, turns on the television and surfs the channels. She stops on a station
when she hears a man say, "Be healed in the name of
Jesus! A deaf person is being healed right now; a sinus
condition has been cleared. I give you the anointing!
Touch! Touch!" The speaker, a preacher dressed

A

in an impeccable white suit and a wig who stands
on a stage in the midst of a jammed football stadium, turns to the camera and asks the viewer to
feel the "anointing," to have faith in Jesus, to
touch the screen and believe. Gospel music fills
the stadium.
145
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go after that which is lost until he find it?
. I say unto you, there is joy in the presence of

Overcome by emotion, Jane kneels in front of the
screen with her hand outstretched, praying for a cure
for her liver disease. She learns that the preacher will
come to her town as part of his "miracle crusade," and

the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth. 9
Taking this command to heart, televangelists cater
their message to such an audience. Catching the fancy
of these susceptible viewers, who believe the preacher
refers to their specific problems or spiritual travails, tel-

he could touch her, like the people on stage, if she
attends. All he asks in return is for a small donation to
continue doing the "Lord's work." Contribute to his
cause she must, for Jane wishes to live, to be healed.
The preceding fictional account 2 provides just one

evangelists create parishioners-at-a-distance.

Like all

example of contemporary televangelism, representing
one of the programs one could watch around the clock
on any religious programming channel. The term "televangelism" refers to the combination of television and
Christian evangelical preaching, usually fundamentalist in nature. 3 Televangelism encompasses a variety of

good parishioners, these viewers repay the debt of eternal salvation by making contributions to sustain the
ministry, to save more "lost" souls.
The viewer may not know for what purpose the funds

activities. In general, they may be classified into five
kinds: sermons, fundraising, news reporting, faith healing, and talk shows. 4 Prominent figures in the industry
include Paul Crouch, Jerry Falwell, Billy Graham,

saved. Of course, because these religious organizations
are almost entirely free of any governmental regulation,
they can collect unlimited funds for any purpose they
desire. 10 The purposes often vary, ranging from producing a motion picture, to building a new hall for a uni-

Benny

Hinn, John

Kennedy,

Oral Roberts,

will be used, but he may regard that as unimportant as
long as the ministry continues and more souls are

Pat

5

versity, to supporting relief missions in the Third World,
or to simply meeting operating costs of the station."
Successful networks bring in enough cash to do all of
the above and more. For instance, on a single day in

Robertson, Robert Schuller, and Jack van Impe. Two
major cable televangelist networks, each with worldwide reach, exist: The Christian Broadcasting Network
(CBN), 6 a product of Pat Robertson, and the Trinity
Broadcast Network (TBN), 7 run by Paul Crouch and his
wife, Janice Crouch.
Televangelists often target the Jane or John Does of

January 2000, CBN received approximately $324,000 in
contributions within thirty minutes.12 This success is
not unprecedented. Of all charitable institutions in the
United States, religious organizations generate the
most income. According to the American Association of
Fund-Raising Counsel (AAFRC), Americans contributed $190.16 billion to non-profit organizations in
1999.13 Of that amount, $143.71 billion (75.6 percent)

the world-people with physical ailments, drug addictions, or financial problems, who seek to ease the pain,
emptiness, and hopelessness of their lives.8 Apart from
broadcasting church services and preaching, religious
networks offer programs dealing with the problems of
today's society, and why people should turn to Jesus to
achieve salvation. Others show testimonials of people

was given by individuals. 14 Religious organizations,
which constituted "the largest component of total giving," received $81.78 billion (43.0 percent) of all dona-

who endured great suffering until they found Christ.
Still others show great healing miracles, pastors performing exorcisms, or ministers proving that current
events are in fulfillment of apocalyptic prophecies.

tions. 15
The mass reach of television finds distraught John
and Jane Does everywhere, many of whom will donate
their money in exchange for promises of salvation.
Within the past two decades, however, several prominent televangelists have been convicted of crimes relat-

The guarantee of salvation in the
next life through repentance is, cer-

ed to their ministries.' 6

Jim Bakker lends a prime
example, but his is hardly an isolated case. Several others have been targeted by the media and other organi17
zations for questionable practices in their ministries.

tainly, attractive to many whose present existence is a living hell. Indeed,

by Juan

Gonzalo
Villasefior

as Christ himself proclaimed:
What man of you, having an
hundred sheep, if he lose one of

In some cases, legal action has even been pursued,
including the following claims: (1) criminal prosecution
for racketeering (e.g., mail fraud);' 8 (2) revocation or

them, doth not leave the ninety
and nine in the wilderness, and
146
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suspension of broadcasting licenses by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission); 19
and (3) private civil Racketeering Influenced and
20
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) actions.
These remedies, however, can be granted only after
the alleged illegal conduct has occurred. Further, they
are often unworkable solutions. But any proposal offering an alternative solution comes with important ques-

show how religious broadcasters came from being pariahs of the airwaves to becoming a powerful force in the
broadcasting world.
Religious broadcasters were present on the airwaves
during the early period of unregulated radio broadcasting. 22 Although most Christian faiths were represented,

tions attached.

evangelicals were certainly in the majority.23 However,
when station owners realized they could make a profit
by selling airtime, turning radio into a business, most

Finally, if the above solutions fail to be effective or constitutional, do individual viewers have a recourse if
they are the victims of allegedly deceptive practices by

religious broadcasters faced stiff competition and were
squeezed out of the picture. 24 This trend continued during the early years of regulation under the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC). 25 The FRC used its authority to restrict "evangelical access to the airwaves." 26 For

televangelists?
This Note discusses the proposed legal responses to

example, it did so by reassigning existing religious stations to low-powered frequencies (with less reach), and

Are prophylactic regulations by the
government of certain televangelist programs feasible?
Perhaps more importantly, are they constitutional?

the
problem
of
fraud 21 by televan-

Of all charitable institutions in the United
States, religious

organizations generate

the most

gelists. Finding the
solutions constitutionally deficient,

income. According to the American Association of Fund-

politically unsound,
or practically inef-

$190.16 billion to non-pr(fit organizations in 1999. Of

fective
rents,

as
it

deterthen

explores the possibility of a content-

Raising

Counsel

(AAFRC), Americans

contributed

that amount, $143.71 billion (75.6 percent) was given by
individuals; religious organizations, which constitute
"the largest component of total giving," received $81.78 billion (43.0 percent) of all donations.

based restriction on
televangelists' speech. The Note concludes that such a
deliberate restriction on speech cannot withstand First
Amendment scrutiny, regardless of the dishonesty or
disingenuousness one may find in televangelists' tactics. Accordingly, despite the great potential for decep-

by not granting licenses to new religious stations. 27
As a result of this
systematic exclusion
from

the

airwaves,
both by radio networks
and the federal government, a group of
evangelical broadcasters
formed
the
National

Broadcasters (NRB) in

Religious

1944.28

However, the policy of
exclusion by the networks continued even with the
advent of television in the 1950s. 29 It was not until
1960 when religious broadcasters would not be excluded from the airwaves anymore.

The FCC issued a

tion, televangelists' activities are, and should be,
absolutely protected by the First Amendment. Any proposed remedy to deal with televangelism must occur in

Statement of Policy that allowed broadcasters to sell air
time for religious programs and still satisfy the
Commission's requisite "public interest" standard. 30

the marketplace of ideas, which is an approach consistent with First Amendment values. Thus, each individual must determine what worth, if any, exists in tele-

Broadcasters thus had a real incentive to sell their airtime to television preachers.
The law of supply and demand tells the rest of the
story. By 1977, evangelical religious broadcasting came
from systemic exclusion from the airwaves to taking up
92 percent of all religious broadcasting time.31 This

vangelists' speech.
THE INDUSTRY
To provide a better context for the present discussion,
it is appropriate to trace briefly the history and prominence of religious broadcasting in the United States.
Evangelism over the airwaves, either by radio or television, is not a new phenomenon. It goes back to the early
days of radio in the 1920s. Tracing this history will

dominance continues presently. Most of the 285
Christian television stations in existence today are
32
evangelical.
Although religious in nature, these broadcasters
behave like any other commercial television stationafter all, they are in the telecommunications business.
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evision. The FCC has extensive statutory authority,
Some of the main players in the religious broadcasting
supported by case law, to regulate broadcasters in accorindustry, like Paul Crouch, Rev. Schuller, and Benny
dance with the public interest. Unfortunately, the FCC
Hinn, for instance, have established, or want to estabdoes not offer means by which a televangelist's audience
lish, themselves in Southern California, the Mecca of
could seek civil remedies for alleged fraud; it can only
the entertainment and the entertainment technology
revoke television stations' licenses to operate, or preindustries. 33 It makes sense for religious broadcasters
to concentrate in Southern California, in close contact
with "the best people in the industry" and "within easy
34
reach of many celebrities who help drum up support.
But in spite of the remarkable success that televangelists have had in the last thirty years, religious broadcasting may be at a crossroads. Immense popularity
with their viewers in the past may be changing. A
recent study commissioned by Pat Robertson's CBN
found that "a third of viewers polled who consider themselves evangelical Christians said they [do not] like religious television." 35 The figure increased to sixty percent
when the persons responding identified themselves as
not evangelical. 36 So an apparent mismatch between
what televangelists offer and what viewers want to see
may be taking place. As a Pepperdine University professor put it, "How many preachers can you watch in a
twenty-four hour period?" 37 Thus, it appears that televangelists' present challenge is to transform their for38
mat based on what viewers really want to see.
Otherwise, these dissatisfied viewers will turn the television off, and televangelists' coffers may run dry.
"RELIGIOUS FRAUD" PROSECUTION
Arguably, none of the three main tools for preventing
televangelist fraud-criminal prosecution, FCC regulation, and civil suits-adequately deter potential malfeasance. For instance, to assess fraudulent intent in a
criminal "religious fraud" case, a court tests the sincerity of the alleged wrongdoer's belief in what he or she
The defendant's belief is questioned
propounds.
because the First Amendment's free exercise guarantee39 must be "subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country .... 40 Some enterprises, though claiming to be
religious, may be merely commercial in nature and
should not "enjoy the immunities granted to the
sacred ' 41 by the Free Exercise Clause. An irreconcilable
problem and tension exists in this proposition. How can
a court prove that a religion is not what it claims to be,
42
that it is a sham?
Similar problems hamper FCC regulation. In one
respect, televangelists expose themselves to the rules
and regulations of the FCC by virtue of their use of tel-

vent expanded transmissions by denying building permits. Further, the FCC cannot reach all televangelists.
Only those who operate their own television stations,
such as Pat Robertson's CBN or Paul Crouch's TBN, fall
within the reach of the FCC. Ambulatory preachers,
like Benny Hinn or W. Eugene Scott, 43 can buy airtime
on different television networks and effectively escape
FCC regulation.
The third option, RICO, appears better at first
glance, but less attractive as the focus tightens. On its
face, RICO seems to provide a civil remedy to persons
wronged by televangelists, allowing plaintiffs to recover
treble damages for all lost donations, as well as reasonable attorney's fees. Private actions by disillusioned
viewers and wronged parishioners would surely signal
financial ruin for disingenuous televangelists.
In theory, this approach appears both sound and
equitable. However, what has actually occurred paints
a very different picture. Since a commentator suggested this approach in 1988, 44 two civil RICO suits involving televangelists have been filed. Both of these cases
raise questions as to the effectiveness and viability of
civil RICO against televangelists. Taken with all of the
above concerns, they also cast serious doubt over the
viability of any present regulation or restriction aimed
at preventing potential televangelist fraud.
Criminal Prosecution: Sincerity of Belief
In United States v. Ballard, 45 the only Supreme Court
case dealing with the criminal prosecution of fraud in a
religious context, 46 the Court in effect sanctioned the
"sincerity of belief' test. 47 Ballard involved a prosecution for using, and conspiring to use, the mail system to
The three defendants, headed by Guy
defraud. 46
49
Ballard (who also alleged to be "Saint Germain, Jesus,
George Washington, and Godfre Ray King"), claimed to
have been selected by divine will as the so-called "ascertained masters. '50 As such, they would communicate to
the world the words of the "divine entity," the teachings
5
of which constituted their "I Am" movement. ' This
dynamic trio claimed they had the ability, through their
supernatural powers, "to heal persons of ailments and

fllmtv
diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any

te

The defendants, the indictment

of belief' test in subsequent fraud related to religious
misrepresentation cases, 63 and the Supreme Court 64

charged, "well knew" these representations were false,
but nevertheless used the mails to organize and pro53
mote the "I Am" movement.

and other courts, 65 have done so in related types of
cases.
However, not everyone gives the "sincerity of belief'

At the request of counsel, the district court judge
advised the jury that although some of the defendants'
teachings "might seem extremely improbable to a great
54
many people," it was immaterial to consider them.

test such a warm reception.

Accordingly, the jury was not permitted to "speculate on
the actuality of the happening" of their tenets. 55 In
short, the court determined that the religious beliefs of

Texas Supreme Court has explicitly adopted Justice
Jackson's arguments in Ballard, and the U.S. Supreme

diseases ....

"52

the defendants could not be an issue. 56 Instead, the
judge instructed them to determine whether the defendants "honestly and in good faith believe[d]" the things
they professed to believe. 57 If so, they should be acquitted; if not, they must be found guilty.58 The jury, following this instruction, found them guilty.
The Court of Appeals, reasoning that the jury should
have considered the truth or falsity of the defendants'
beliefs, reversed the district court's judgment and
60
ordered a new trial. 59 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Court agreed with the district court's jury instructions, suggesting that inquiring about the truth of the
claimants' beliefs would be prohibited. Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas stated that the First
Amendment "precludes such a course" because .'[t]he
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of

Even in Ballard itself,

Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion6 6 advanced three
arguments that exposed the serious analytical and
philosophical flaws of this test. More recently, the

Court has implied that looking into the sincerity of
someone's belief may be improper.
Justice Jackson first argued that, as a threshold matter, the "misrepresentation of religious experience or
belief' is itself impossible to prosecute. 67 When the
majority in Ballard distinguished between assessing
whether someone's beliefs are sincerely held and
whether those beliefs are actually true, it made a distinction without a difference. For, Justice Jackson asks,
"... how can we separate an issue as to what is believed
from considerations as to what is believable?"68 That is
to say, how can someone believe something to be false if
the thing itself cannot be proven false? For example, if
a defendant claims he has mental powers, bequeathed
to him by his God, that allow him to heal people, how
can anyone prove that he does not believe he has them?
That he is unable to heal people would not prove he

no dogma, the establishment of no sect."'6 1 He continued:

himself does not believe he possesses mental powers.
While his inability to heal others may raise doubt as to

Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution.
Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their reli-

whether his powers are effective, or even as to their
reality, it would not prove that he does not believe he
has them. The majority failed to consider these crucial
epistemologica169 considerations, and instead opened

gious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that
they may be beyond the ken of mortals does
not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law ....
Man's relation to his God
was made no concern of the state. He was
granted the right to worship as he pleased
and to answer to no man for the verity of his
62
religious views.
Because the only issue before the Court was whether
the district court correctly suppressed the question of
the truth of the defendants' beliefs, the decision did not
explicitly sanction the instruction actually given.
Nevertheless, lower courts have adopted the "sincerity

the door to a pointless and dangerous inquiry, since it is
impossible to prove the truth or falseness of religious
representations, and since it involves a subjective determination on what the judge perceives to be "sincere" in
each case.
However, this is not to say that a defendant in such a
fraud case, who made representations empirically verifiable in nature, could not be convicted. On the contrary, in such a case the prosecution could very well submit proof of the representations' falsity, and thereby
establish criminal liability. Indeed, this is the only kind
of act that a televangelist could be prosecuted or be
liable for under a fraud count. For example, if a defendant maintained that he shook hands with Saint
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Germain in San Francisco on a given day and asked for
donations based on that fact, it "would be open to the
Government to submit to the jury proof that he had
never been in San Francisco ....-70
Second, Justice Jackson raised a more practical concern in Ballard. Religious experience is diverse and
unique. In a case for "religious fraud," the jury will likely be composed of nonbelievers relative to the defendant's faith, 71 especially if the religious association is
new or non-traditional.7 2 These
nonbelievers will be asked to
determine whether the defendant's religious beliefs or repreSaid
sentations were sincere.
quoting
Jackson,
Justice
American psychologist William
James, "'If you ask what these
[religious] experiences are, they
are conversations with the
unseen, voices and visions,
responses to prayer, changes of
heart, deliverances from fear,
inflowings of help, assurances of
support .... ."'73 A non-believer is
unlikely to understand the

O V LLSE

)R
the tenets of the Jehovah's Witness faith, the IJ, in so
determining, "made a judgment, based on ... his personal perception of the customs of Jehovah's Witnesses
...."81 What if Mejia-Paiz had sworn under oath only
once, and later affirmed? Would that be enough to
make him a bona fide Jehovah's Witness? In reality, the
determination of church membership was not a question for the IJ or the government at all; it was a question for the Jehovah's Witness Church.8 2 Nevertheless,

In a case for "religious fraud," the
jury will likely be composed of nonbe-

what
illustrates
Mejia-Paiz
occurs when judges become "lay
theologians ,"' 83 transforming a
court of law into an ecclesiastical

tribunal.
lievers relative to the (efendant's faith,

At least one court has agreed

especially if the religious association is with Justice Jackson's argunew or non-traditional.

8 4

lievers will be asked to determine
whether

the

In Tilton v.
Supreme
Texas
the
Marshall,
Court concluded that the sinceri-

These nonbe- ments in Ballard.

defendant's

religious

beliefs or representations were sincere.A non-believer is unlikely to under-

ty of belief test is "irrelevant" for
cases where a claim for fraud is
based solely on a "statement of
religious doctrine or belief."8 5

stand the defendant's religious repre- Because such a statement's falsity cannot be proved, it "is of no

sentation and, consequently, unlikely to moment" whether the statement
defendant's religious representation and, consequently, unlikely believe him. This problem is especially is made "honestly or in bad
to believe him. 74 This problem is
especially aggravated if the faith
to which the defendant belongs is
one that is viewed unfavorably
75
by the general public.

faith. 8 6
aggravated if the faith to which the

defendant belongs is one that is viewed
unfavorably by the general public.

Finally, even if the inquiry into the sincerity of belief
is open-minded, how much "sincere belief' is sufficient
for a person to escape liability for fraud?76 For instance,
in Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 77 the court upheld a decision by an
Immigration Judge (IJ) who had determined that
Mejia-Paiz did not hold a sincere belief in the Jehovah's
Witness faith.7 8 The evidence disproving Mejia-Paiz's
supposed belief included his taking of the customary
courtroom oath, his inability to remember when he
became a Jehovah's Witness, and other inconsistencies
in his testimony.79 Swearing under oath, the IJ determined, was inconsistent with what a Jehovah's Witness
would do, since past Jehovah's Witnesses who had
appeared before the IJ had declined to "swear" under
80
God and would only "affirm.."
Even if Mejia-Paiz's acts were not in accordance with

In holding this, the
court followed the distinctions
made by Justice Jackson's dissent in Ballard. Accordingly, the

Texas Supreme Court established
two categories on which claims for fraud, involving a
televangelist, may be brought-only one of which may
form a valid claim.
One concerns representations in which a person says
he will perform "certain concrete acts."8 7 For instance,
in Tilton televangelist Robert Tilton had promised that
he would read, touch, and pray over followers' prayer
requests.8 8 Since these representations could be proved
false through experience,8 9 fraud claims against Tilton
based on these representations would not infringe on
his First Amendment rights.9 0 A claim based on the failure to perform a concrete act would not necessarily
involve a person's beliefs; rather, the matter at issue
would be whether the person indeed carried out the acts
as he promised.91 If he did not perform the acts, and the
person was deceived intentionally, incurring a monetary

fIm tv n: te
loss, he could be liable for fraud.
The second category involves representations based
on "religious doctrine or belief."92 For example, this
would include soliciting funds, and justifying the
request with biblical passages that emphasize believers
93

to tithe.

Whether these representations are made sincerely or insincerely, they are representations of religious doctrine, and "no jury can be allowed to determine
their truth or falsity . . . -94 By this statement, the
Texas Supreme Court implies that no difference exists
in evaluating whether a belief is sincerely or insincere95
ly held and whether the belief itself is true or false.
Thus, a claim of fraud could not rest under this type of
representations.
The U.S. Supreme Court may have taken the argument in Tilton to its next step in Employment Div. v.
Smith. 96 Here, the Court characterized Ballard as a
case in which the government may not "punish the
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false. .
S.97 This implies that the government may not prosecute someone because it disbelieves a person who holds
what the government feels to be a false belief. That is,
if one thinks that a belief is false, it is reasonable to
doubt that anyone could in all seriousness believe it. 98
When the government prosecutes someone in this scenario, it effectively and implicitly doubts the sincerity
with which the person holds the belief. This, the Court
stated, the government may not do. Smith, thus, supports the position that not only is it irrelevantto inquire
into the sincerity of someone's belief, "when the religious representation forms the basis of a fraud claim, ' 99
but that it is also unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan once referred to Ballard as the
Court's severest test with regard to the "mandate of
judicial neutrality in theological controversies."'' 0 0 The
danger of religious persecution that Justice Jackson
referred to' 0 ' is a real possibility when courts apply the
sincerity of belief test. Even though this test has been
employed by courts to determine fraudulent intent,
Smith and Tilton show that the justifications for its continued application in religious "fraud" cases have been
called into doubt. Even if Guy Ballard or televangelists
are frauds, their religious beliefs and representations
are "beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of
freedom of religion ... is that we must put up with, and
even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."' 1 2 Thus, the sincerity of belief test cannot be a practical or even desir-

able solution to prosecute or deter televangelist fraud.
FCC Regulation
With the Federal Communications Act of 1934,103
Congress created the FCC and endowed it with broad
statutory authority to enforce the provisions contained
in the Act. 0 4 The FCC has authority to grant, 105 suspend, 10 6 or revoke1 07 radio or television licenses, renewal permits, and construction permits to broadcasters.
Further, the Supreme Court has explicitly determined
that the FCC possesses concurrent authority with the
U.S. Department of Justice in enforcing provisions of
the United States Code. 108 In that light, for example,
the FCC has the authority to revoke a station license or
construction permit if a licensee violates 18 U.S.C. §
1343109 (fraud by wire, radio or television). 11°
In order to grant or deny television or radio stations
licenses to operate, the Commission must decide in
accordance with the "public interest.""' The Supreme
Court has given the Commission "substantial judicial
deference" in determining what constitutes the public
interest.112 Regulation under the public interest standard has varied throughout the years, ranging from
skeletal programming requirements on licensees in the
1 4
1940s,1 3 to more exacting conditions in the 1960s, 1
then less imposing requirements again in the 1970s
with the FCC's adoption of a public interest "marketplace" approach. 1 5 Currently, the FCC imposes upon
licensed broadcasters a "number of affirmative public
interest programming and service obligations."1 1 6
example:
[L]icensees must provide coverage of issues
facing their communities and place lists of
programming used in providing significant
treatment of such issues in their public
inspection files ....
[Licensees] must also
comply with statutory political broadcasting
requirements regarding equal opportunities,
charges for political advertising, and reasonable access for federal candidates [and] must
provide children's educational and informational programming ....
In terms of programming obligations, broadcasters are also
prohibited from airing programming that is
obscene . . . . Similarly, broadcasters also
have obligations regarding closed captioning,
equal employment opportunity, sponsorship
(continued at page 153)
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NG TUE EXRCIS OF REHGION: CONGRESSIONAL REA(TION TO

EMPLOYMENT Div. v. SMITH
Recently, Congress has tied to circumvent the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smivi with tbur bills aimed at
protecting the exercise of religion. Below is a briefsUm

ry of purpose, content, and status of each:

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 2
What it was:

A 1993 attempt by Congress to "overrule" QIl and reinstate the "compelling governmental interest test" ofprvious
Supreme Court cases.

What it said:

"Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burdl results from a rule of genera] applicability, except . [where the burdenj is in furtherance of a compelling governmental intecrest ... and is the least
rcstrictive means of furhrming that compelling govemmental inteet."

How it fared:

Passcd by Congress but ovew led by the Supreme Court in City ofliBonle v. Floresl on the grounds that (1) it was not a
enth Amenent and (2) in passing the stAute, Congress acted
properly -medial" action under §5 of the F
"against the background ofa judicial interprCation of the Constitution already issued tin Smithl" and could not expect its
enactment to ornol in thlefice of such a contrary Court precedent.

The Religious Freedom Act (RFA)4

What it was:

A 1997 constitutional amendment, potentially to the FirstAmendment itself' offered as a Joint Resolution in the House
.ores.
of Representatives in relaction to the demise of the RFRA in

What it said:

'To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of conscience: the people's right to pray and
to recognie teir religious belief, hrtage, or traditions on pubhlc propery, including schools, shall not be infringed"

How it fared:

Failed to recive th necessary two-thirds majority in the House.

The Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPAY'
What it was:

A 1999 bill attempting to revive the RFRA in specific circumstlcs, particularly those at issue in Llores.

What it sad:

"A govenment shall not substantially burden a person's religious exercise in a program or actvity, opcrated by a gowmment, that receives fecral financial assistance, or in any case in which the substantial burden., at.-cts ... commerce
even if the burden results from a rule ofgenea applicability [except where the burden] is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. , and is the least restrictive meas of utherfing that compelling govemmental interest."
In addition, the RLPA included sections that (1) pkcd the initial burden of proof on the persn challenging the burden
and (2) addressed the specific fact pattern in Elg, forbidding the government from applying a "land use regulation" in
such a way as "to impose a substantial burden on a person's religious exercise$" unless the governm had a compelling
interest to justify the regulation.

How it fared:

Passed in the House. but failed in the Senate.

The Religious Lmd Use and lnstitutionmlized Persons Act (RLUIPA)

A moified more successful version ofthe RLPA's land use regukaio

What it said:

In situations involving "Tederal financial assistance," "commere," or "land use.., regulations [where] individual assessments" are made, "[njo govemment shal impoe or implement a land use regulation in a manner that iposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise ofa person. including a reliious assembly or institution. [except where the
ncof a compelling governmental interest... and is th least restrictive means of furthering ta
burdeni is in fu
ompelling govemmental interest'" Inaddition, governments may not treat unequally, discriminat against or exclude
mbl[ies or instituFion[s" in the application of any land use regulations'. Lastly, tie RLUIPA prohibits
"religious
goverment from burdening the religious ex'ercise of institutionalized pensons, even via laws of general applicability,
unless the burden serves a compelling govermental interest by the least restrictive means p ible.

How it fared:

to the RLPA and F
Became law in 2000. despitc its similarity
Commerce Clause rather tha §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
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identification, and advertisements during
117
children's programming.

exhortation, proselytizing, or statements of
personally-held religious views and beliefs . .
. . Thus, church services generally will not

Armed with its malleable public interest standard,
the FCC has over the years revoked existing licenses of,
or denied licenses to, religious broadcasting stations
which the Commission found not to further the public
interest.'1 8 Curiously, however, when the FCC had the
opportunity to exercise its recognized authority1 19 over
the most widely known case of televangelist fraud--Jim
120
Bakker's television ministry-it declined to do so.
In that case, the FCC launched an investigation of
Bakker's Praise the Lord (PTL) television network after
a newspaper reported that funds solicited from viewers
had been improperly redirected. 121 PTL continuously
refused to respond to the FCC's subpoenas for documents, acquiescing only after the Department of Justice
became involved. 122 But even after an extensive gathering of PTL documents by the Commission over the
course of two years, the FCC simply forwarded the documents to the Justice Department, without issuing a
123

formal opinion.
Further, the results of the FCC's PTL
investigation were not published in the FCC's Official
Reports.1 24 One commentator surmised that the FCC's
actions, in light of its decision in the PTL case, signaled
a retreat from the exercise of its authority over televan125

gelists.
Viewed more broadly, it might have indicated
an "outright retreat from controversial regulation
126
issues."
Since the FCC's non-involvement in the PTL matter,
the Commission has revoked the broadcasting license of
few televangelists. 2 7 Unfortunately, even in many of
those instances, the FCC's regulation left much to be
desired. For example, in a recent and unprecedented
opinion, the Commission ventured to say what kind of

qualify as 'general educational programming
1 32

under our rules.'
This decision drew a flood of criticism against the
FCC,133 and swift reaction by Congress followed. The
Commission received more than 1,000 letters from citizens who opposed the ruling.13 4 In addition, Jerry
Falwell attacked the opinion, calling it an effort to
"silence Christian broadcasting in America." 135 Within
a month after its release, the FCC vacated the prospective guideline portion of WQED

1.136

This attempted

atonement did not appease the U.S. House of
Representatives, which passed the Noncommercial
Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act. 13 7 The bill
would have prohibited the FCC from imposing any content-based requirements on NCETV licensees, 138 like
the ones imposed by the FCC in WQED I. The Senate
did not vote on the bill before adjourning on December
2000 and, therefore, it failed during the past session of
Congress.
WQED I provides an example of classic "knee-jerk"
regulation. The Commission explained in WQED II
that it had attempted to "clarify what constitute[d] nonprogramming."' 139
educational
commercial
Unfortunately, in trying to clarify, the FCC overstepped
its authority, engaging in content review of programs,
and possibly infringing on broadcasters' protected
rights of freedom of speech and exercise of religion. 140
Though curbing sectarian, intolerant, and divisive religious speech by televangelists may be a desirable social
objective, accomplishing that goal through content regulation is inappropriate.

religious programming would not qualify as "educational.' 128 In WQED I, WQED, a noncommercial educational station (NCETV), applied to transfer its license to

Clearly, then, the FCC has not regulated televangelists appropriately. After displaying great hesitance to

Cornerstone, a commercial television station whose programming was mostly religious in nature. 129 Called to

the opposite-active and aggressive regulation-in

decide whether Cornerstone could qualify as a NCETV,
the FCC ruled in the affirmative, 130 but issued prospective guidelines "regarding the review of programs.., for
the reserved NCETV channels." 131 The Commission
addressed what kind of religious programming would

intervene in the PTL case, the Commission attempted
WQED I and WQED II. Again, its efforts backfired,
leaving the FCC right back where it started. Ultimately,
the tale of FCC regulation in this area consists of little
more than erratic efforts of non-regulation and misregulation, none of which offer the public any real protection.

not qualify as "educational" for purposes of establishing
compliance with NCETV guidelines.
Such would
include:
[PIrogramming primarily devoted to religious

Private Civil RICO Actions
One commentator has argued that private attorney
general suits under RICO may effectively deter fraudu-
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14
lent religious solicitation by televangelists. ' Section
1964(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code allows civil

actions under RICO, providing:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee .... 142
Establishing a prima facie civil RICO claim requires
143
four elements. First, a plaintiff must allege an injury.
Second, two predicate acts of racketeering activity with44
Third, those
in a 10-year period must be established.
of
racketeering
pattern
a
predicate acts must establish
activity.145 Finally, the pattern of racketeering must be
146
related to an existing racketeering enterprise.
According to commentators, these elements are "easily
met and should pose little difficulty in most religious
1 47
racketeering cases."'
Civil RICO can only be targeted at religious organizations that seek pecuniary contributions from members for specific advertised purposes, and then divert
the funds to serve different purposes. Private suits
under RICO do not implicate the validity of the religion
or the "sincerity of belief' test. In
other words, Ballard's concerns
will not be present in a civil RICO
case. A plaintiff can question the
"use of funds solicited for a purpose wholly different than that
advertised"'14 without questioning the televangelist's or the religious organization's theological
tenets.

VLL SEO)R
action . . . ."151 Alleged fraud committed by televangelists is a controversial matter; government agencies
often either lack the resources to get involved, or may
refuse to do for fear of negative public feedback-recall
the FCC in Bakker's PTL affair.
However, the reality of private RICO suits diverges
from its hopeful potential, casting doubts as to the effectiveness and viability of such actions against televangelists. Two problems present themselves. First, in the
only case on record in which private citizens sued a televangelist for fraud under a civil RICO cause of action,
15 2
Secondly, just
the plaintiffs failed to win a judgment.
as former faithful viewers can sue a televangelist under
RICO, so too can a televangelist use RICO to sue others,1 53 should his dubious ministry be scrutinized or
threatened.
Teague I arose following the failure of infamous televangelist Jim Bakker's PTL ministry. There, a group of
about 160,000 individuals filed a class action suit for
fraud against Bakker, one of his personal aides, a PTL
Bakker,
board member, and PTL's auditing firm.
through PTL, had solicited funds via mail to build
Heritage USA, a "Christian retreat center for families."1 54 Plaintiffs alleged that Bakker had oversold
memberships to Heritage USA, despite having prom-

Establishing a prima facie civil RICO
claim requires four elements. First, a

plaintiff must allege an injury. Second,
two predicate acts of racketeering activity
within a 10-year period i mst be established. Third, those predicate acts must
establish a pattern of racketeering

ised PTL viewers that he would
limit the sale of such memberships so as to ensure that each
member would be able to use the
facility annually. 155 Also, the
complaint alleged that Bakker
had actually used few of the
funds collected for building
"Instead,
Heritage USA. 156
Bakker used partnership funds
to pay operating expenses of the
PTL and to support a lavish

The remedies provided by
activity. Finally, the pattern of
RICO seem to make it an attracto an lifestyle."'157 In addition, plaintive solution for not only those racketeering must be related
tiffs contended that PTL's
defrauded by televangelists, but
existing racketeering enterprise.
accounting firm, Bakker's aide,
for the general public as well.
and the board member aided and abetted "Bakker's
Because racketeering includes not only mail or wire
149
it
claimed frauds."'15 In all, plaintiffs pursued five claims,
fraud but also a myriad of other illegal activities,
based on violations of state common law regarding
gives private parties great incentives to bring suit
fraud, federal securities laws, South Carolina's
against televangelists. A prevailing plaintiff may
150
Timeshare Act, federal RICO, and North Carolina's
More
receive treble damages and attorney's fees.
RICO statute. 159 The plaintiffs prevailed on only the
importantly, the televangelist would likely be financialcommon law fraud claim.
ly ruined and unable to commit further frauds. Private
Considering that Bakker had already been convictRICO actions also "eliminate the need for governmental

fIm tv n e
16 0

ed
by another jury of twenty-four counts of federal
mail and wire fraud-both racketeering offenses-his
escape from civil RICO liability claims in Teague I is
remarkable. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence of Bakker's conviction, though not admissible to
prove his character "in order to show action in conform61
ity therewith," could be admitted for other purposes.
It is unclear whether plaintiffs' counsel attempted to
admit this evidence, but its failure to enter the record
may account for the puzzling contradiction.
Simply because these particular plaintiffs could not
to convince a particular jury that Bakker and his staff
had committed racketeering acts does not foreclose the
possibility that different plaintiffs in other RICO suits
against televangelists may win. Nevertheless, considering that Bakker's case is a prime example of televan-

ing that the "alleged acts were all part of a single, lawful endeavor-namely the production of television news
reports concerning a particular subject." 169 However,
the court also stated in a footnote that "the law in other
circuits might have allowed [Tilton's] case to proceed
170
further."
However, this was not Tilton's only lawsuit. 171 He
also sued his nemesis, Ole Anthony (founder of Trinity
Foundation, a televangelist watchdog organization),
who assisted ABC in performing the "trash sweeps" of
Tilton's church for the Prime~lme Live program. Here,
the televangelist alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§1985(3) for depriving him of equal protection or equal
172
privileges and immunities.
Ultimately, all of Tilton's suits failed. Nevertheless,
Tilton opened the door for the use of civil RICO as a

gelist fraud, and considering his prior conviction of
racketeering crimes, the failure of the plaintiffs in

weapon against individuals and organizations who
attempt to expose questionable religious practices.

Teague I to secure a RICO judgment casts a doubt as to
the effectiveness of this remedy against televangelist

Facing this possibility, prospective private attorneys

fraud.
More problems may exist in §1962 of the RICO Act,

general may be deterred from bringing these types of
lawsuits against televangelists. As the Tilton cases
show, a threatened televangelist can be litigious-not

which does not limit who the potential plaintiff may be.
According to that section, a civil RICO action is avail-

surrendering without a fight, taking full advantage of
the judicial process, and prolonging the dispute. If the

able to "any person who has been injured in his business
or property by reason of' a pattern of racketeering activity.16 2 Such a person may even include a televangelist.

televangelist has deep pockets, stuffed perhaps with the
donations of unwary souls, he may be able to drag out
the suit until plaintiffs' counsel can no longer bear the

Indeed, Robert Tilton, a well-known televangelist in
late 1980s and early 1990s, proved this point by suing
ABC's Dianne Sawyer, among others, for alleged violations of RICO.163

financial burdens of the representation.

The suit arose from a television report aired on ABC's
news show PrimeTime Live in November 1991.164

As shown above, the proposed solutions 173 to prevent
and deter televangelists from engaging in questionable
practices in their ministries are constitutionally defi-

During the piece at issue, Sawyer criticized Tilton's
fundraising practices, reporting that Tilton "personally
acquired millions of dollars of donations sent to the
Church" and threw away prayer requests before praying over them as he had promised. 6 5 As a result of the
broadcast, membership in Tilton's church dropped
166
sharply, forcing him to end his television ministry.

THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF CONTENT-BASED REGULATION OF TELEVANGELISTS' SPEECH

cient, politically unsound or ineffective. As an additional alternative, content-based regulation should be
briefly explored to determine whether it is constitutional to pursue such a restriction of a televangelist's
speech.
If televangelist programming could fit within one of
the categories of speech that are excluded from First

In response, Tilton alleged that ABC had violated
§1962(c), which prohibits persons employed by an enterprise from conducting or participating in the enter167
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering.

Amendment protection, the state could regulate it with
an end to prevent their improper practices. Through
content-based speech restrictions, prophylactic meas-

Ultimately, Tilton's suit was dismissed by the district
court for failure to state a claim, a decision affirmed by
the court of appeals. 168 The court held that Tilton failed
to plead a pattern of racketeering activity by ABC, stat-

ures could preclude financial injury to viewers who
would otherwise send monetary donations to disreputable televangelist ministries. Such measures would
apply to televangelists who solicit money from mass tel-
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evision audiences.
A legislature could target the kinds of programs
where it deemed that misrepresentation may occur, or
where viewers' susceptibilities may be exploited. For
instance, religious programs on television that consist
of faith healing or apocalyptic prophesizing-in combination with solicitation for funds--could be targeted for
regulation, for it seems likely that potential deception
could stem from these kinds of programs.1 74 Perhaps,
then, a disclaimer may appear in these kinds of programs, stating that the viewer ought not believe what
he will watch blindly, or that he ought to assure himself
that the ministry is legitimate. Thus, viewers and listeners of these programs would be warned before donating their money to a religious ministry.
However, it is unlikely that televangelists' speech
will fall within one of the exceptions to free speech protection. In addition, televangelists' speech will be constitutionally protected as involving the exercise of religion. Thus, the prospect of regulating the content of televangelists programs is most likely proscribed.
The First Amendment forbids the government from
restricting "expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content."1 75 Seminal to the values of the First Amendment is the principle that "the
government must remain neutral in the 'marketplace of
ideas."' 176 Further, the First Amendment also prohibits
177
bans of "public discussion of an entire topic.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court stated in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, "content-based restrictions on speech
are presumptively invalid."178 This hostility against
content-based regulations is not absolute. The presumption of invalidity may be overcome in two ways.
First, content-based regulation is allowed if the speech
"fall[s] within one or more of the various established
exceptions . .,to the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual
expression." 179 Accordingly, the government may apply
content-based restrictions to so-called "fighting
18 1
to
words,"18 0 to speech that advocates illegal conduct,
18 3
18 2
to child to pornography, to conspiratorial
obscenity,
84
to defamation.18 5 Secondly, if the speech
and
speech,
does not fall within these established exceptions, a law
may regulate the content of speech if it is "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If
a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
86
alternative."1

R

Here, it is easy to see that televangelists' speech does
not fall into any of the established exceptions. They do
not engage in obscenity, defamation, conspiracies, advocate illegal conduct, or utter fighting words. Rather,
they proselytize, preach the word of God, pray, discuss
current events, and ask for donations.18 7 Thus, the legislature must offer a compelling reason for its proscription on the content of televangelists' speech. Under the
hypothetical above, the reasons proffered by the legislature are simply not "compelling." Just because misrepresentations may have occurred in the past in charismatic healing programs, it does not mean they will
occur again, or that it is a problem so widespread that
the government should get involved. Further, it would
be difficult to justify this viewpoint discriminatory regulation. This regulation "singles out particular programmers"1 88 for regulation-preachers who engage in
healing and prophesizing. Where the goal of the content-based restriction is to "shield the sensibilities of
the [viewers], the general rule is that the right of
expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists." 18 9 Thus, the hypothetical law would be
held unconstitutional.
Televangelist speech is, therefore, protected speech
and its content may not be regulated. If the government were to regulate the content of televangelists'
190
speech, the state would become the "great censor," the
judge of what ideas are harmful to the public, thus violating its mandate of neutrality in the marketplace of
ideas. That televangelists' speech may be harmful to
those who hear it only underscores its power and impact
on its listeners. 191 But that does not provide a valid reason to proscribe the content of the speech; instead, it
192
emphasizes the need for its protection.
A content-based regulation of televangelists' speech
could also be challenged under the Free Exercise
Clause.1 93 Because the hypothetical regulation here is
content-based, or facially discriminatory, it falls under
the rule of Hialeah. 94 There, the Court stated: "if the

object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neu1 95
The law
tral," that is, it discriminates on its face.
would be invalid unless the government had a "compelling interest" that was narrowly tailored to advance
the purported interest.1 96 Further, it is well established
that "the right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselytize,
and perform other similar religious functions .... -197

film/tv n te
In this case, the regulation probably would be struck

leave the worth of televangelists' speech to the judg-

down because it suppresses the practice of religion. The

ment of the marketplace of ideas. This conclusion may

object of the law is to prevent people from donating

dissatisfy the censors among us who have watched programs in religious channels, and know intuitively that
something is awry, that miracles do not happen so non-

money to allegedly disreputable televangelists because
of the value judgment made on faith healing and apocalyptic prophesizing. Again, just as with free exercise
above, it is difficult to offer a secular compelling government interest that supports such a regulation.
Presumably, if such a law were enacted, it would be
because the government disliked and wished to curb
those particular religious practices for the potential
harm they cause citizens. 198 This
The prospect of
is precisely what occurred in
Hialeah. Because the citizens of
Hialeah were hostile to the unconventional sacrificial practices
involved in Santeria, they supported a regulation that pro19 9

chalantly, that the end of the world cannot be as near as
is claimed, or that not every minister possesses the
power to heal all ailments.

and a desire to censor ideas for their content are simply
inconsistent with American constitutional values.
Tolerance for all opinions is a pivotal guiding principle

a content-based regula- in American society-even if
the

cessfully raise free speech and free exercise

the government cannot do.
Thus, the prospect of a content-

governmental attempt to interfere deliber-

gelists' religious practices is
unfeasible and, more importantly,
unconstitutional.
Televangelists

proffered

are

unconstitutional. Televangelists would suc- these
claims under the First Amendment to any

based regulation to curb televan-

opinions

tion to curb televangeists' religious prac- themselves
intolerant
in
tices is unfeasible and, more importantly, nature. Thus, consistent with

But this

scribed such practices.

But mere dissatisfaction

principles, the First
Amendment dictates that the
government may not regulate
televangelism.
The issue now at hand is to
determine the extent to which

ately with their speech. Moreover, given the marketplace of ideas allows
the prior failures of other means, First the participation of televange-

Amendment success likely gives the lists. This entails an explanation of the theory of the mar-

would successfully raise free
speech and free exercise claims

televangelists the last word in more ketplace of ideas within the
ways than one when it comes to formal First Amendment. Then, apply-

under the First Amendment to

regulation.

any governmental attempt to
interfere deliberately with their speech.

ing the theory to televangelists,

Moreover,

the role of the participants
within the framework needs to be explored. That is to

of other means, First
Amendment success likely gives the televangelists the

say, assuming the absolute constitutional protection of
the free trade in ideas, which televangelists ought to

last word in more ways than one when it comes to formal regulation.

enjoy, what is the antidote to the poisonous speech
uttered by them? Or, put distinctly, what can the poisoned victims, or those who may be poisoned, do?
Justice Holmes, in his seminal Abrams 200 dissent,

given

the

prior

failures

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: THE PROPER REGULATOR
So the journey leads back to the starting point.
Alleged fraud by televangelists is difficult to prosecute.
Statements based on representations arising from religious tenets, articles of faith, or divine commands cannot be fraudulent because these statements cannot be
proved false or true.

Though many would agree that

some activities carried out by televangelists are shameless, and would want them regulated, this is not constitutionally possible.
A valid, effective and constitutional approach to confront the present problem does exist-and that is to

gave rise to modern First Amendment doctrine, 20 1 by
offering the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free
speech. In this case, which arose from convictions
under the Espionage Act, Justice Holmes modified the
"clear and present danger" test he had articulated in
Schenk v. United States, 20 2 elaborating on the proximity and degree elements of the test. The "danger," he
said, must be such that it "imminently threaten[s]
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required
to save the country."20 3 As a rationale for the rule,
Justice Holmes invoked the now-famous marketplace

JLAN G :NZ O V LL SE OR
metaphor:
But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to

trade in ideas to a "marketplace," alluding to the
Ancient Greek agora, which served as the social meeting place for citizens, foreigners, tradesmen, artisans,

believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth

and philosophers. 214 The marketplace of ideas, then,
suggests "diversity and pluralism," 215 an exchange in
which everyone may participate, either by distributing
216
or receiving information.
217
Consistent with these principles, the marketplace

is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to

allows for two kinds of responses in the free trade of
ideas if speakers disagree with what televangelists do.
One is negative, the other positive. One rejects televangelists' poison, the other attempts to prevent others
from being poisoned. Each is explored below.
First, what arguably is a very powerful response to

wager our salvation upon some prophecy
20 4
based upon imperfect knowledge.
As Justice Holmes indicates by his language, the
marketplace of ideas "envisions an unrestricted and

televangelists is rather simple. Individuals have the
right to distribute information in the marketplace.
Individuals also have the right to receive such information. However, it is logical that people should have a

robust exchange of views and opinions whereby such
views and opinions may be available for each person to
either accept or reject on their merits. '20 5 While "truth"
is part of the metaphor, the emphasis is in the "free
20 6
trade" that ought to occur in the marketplace.

right to refuse to receive information, for whatever reason, under any circumstances. This is part of the free
trade in the marketplace. Ideas are exchanged; some

Whatever the truth may be, when finally known, is secondary. Indeed, Justice Holmes notes that life is an
experiment, where truth-or full truth-is unknown,
since we operate "upon some prophecy based upon
'
imperfect knowledge. "207
Because our knowledge is thus limited, it necessarily
follows that "we should be eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
208
loathe and believe to be fraught with death ....
Tolerance for the speech of individuals that we find
utterly repugnant, baseless, and false is the cornerstone
of the marketplace of ideas. 209 Hence, consistent with
this precept, the Supreme Court stated that "under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as false
2 10
idea."
Closely related to the above principles is that the free
exchange of ideas-public or private, offensive or
benign, blasphemous or orthodox-be encouraged and
maximized. 211 In this process of exchange, then, both
the freedom to distribute speech as well as the right to
21 2
receive it are protected by the First Amendment.
What Justice Holmes never stated was what the "market" was, or wherein the "free trade" in ideas would
occur. It was Justice Brennan who grounded the trade
to a "specific locale and context." 213 He assigned the free

are accepted, others rejected. This right to refuse information is similar to the right of an individual not to be
compelled to associate with people who hold objectionable viewpoints, 218 or to the right of an individual not to
speak. 2 19 While some argue convincingly that great barriers to access exist in the marketplace of ideas, because
the "marketplace rewards the powerful 220 to the detriment of powerless groups like women and minorities,
everyone may easily refuse access to speech that they
find objectionable, even by groups who are disenfranchised.
If a viewer finds a televangelist's speech distasteful,
shameless, or disingenuous, she may turn the television
off, or change the channel. Just as televangelists propagate their speech, so may the viewer choose to refuse
to receive their speech. The rejection, in itself, is speech
too. Though negative, it represents a disagreement
and, perhaps, a condemnation of what televangelists do.
For televangelists, when viewers turn off the television
it proves fatal, since it means an end to financial support.
This is precisely what happened to televangelists in
the 1980s. When the press revealed Jim Bakker's PTL
scandal, viewers stopped watching him and sending
PTL "suffered serious and
monetary donations. 221
Oral
ostensibly permanent [financial] losses. '' 222
Roberts, Jimmy Swaggart, and Robert Tilton had a sim-

flmtv n te
ilar fate. 223 This shows that a free trade in ideas can
have a powerful effect on particular individuals and

This we are allowed to do in the marketplace of ideas.
The risk we run in this "experiment" is that the argu-

society.
Integrally connected to the negative response is the
positive one, which is proactive in nature. It requires

ments presented will go unheard, unheeded. The hearer, being satisfied and content to give his money to a

an action, or a reaction, on the speaker's part. It has to
be more than a rejection of the speech presented. 224 In

arguments. In fact, he rejects them. He exercises his
right to refuse to hear our pleas.
This is the double-edged sword built into the marketplace of ideas, in which no one is required to listen to or

fact, it follows, or should follow, naturally from the negative response. 225 After rejecting the speech, the person

questionable television ministry, does not care about the

should explain why she rejected the speech. Of course,
the First Amendment does not require that people justify their views; one may remain silent. But if a person
wishes to convert others to her point of view, to change
minds and attitudes in society, it is imperative that she

believe any particular propositions-even the ones that
may seem obvious to us. If occasionally a weakness in

should explain herself. A mere rejection of the speech
will not suffice.
In this regard, consider Justice Jackson's comments

actions) all prescribe some kind of censorship; in doing
so, each diagnoses its own failure. In the marketplace
of ideas, on the other hand, we may not be able to con-

in Ballard, which exemplify a positive response that
occurs in the marketplace of ideas, and which could be
applicable to a questionable televangelist today:
The chief wrong which false prophets do to
their following is not financial .... There are
those who hunger and thirst after higher val-

vince our poisoned soul, but we may at least express our
thoughts and ideas freely to him, without fear of being
censored. As such, we respond to the potential poison of

the formula, that ultimate degree of freedom is also precisely its strength. The other "solutions" proposed in
this Note (leaving aside ineffective FCC and RICO

televangelism in the best way possible-the way consistent with the values of the First Amendment.

ues which they feel wanting in their humdrum lives. They live in mental confusion or
moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth

CONCLUSION

and beauty and moral support . . . . The
wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the
money the victims part with half so much as
226
in the mental and spiritual poison they get.

or feel as though someone loves them. As long as people continue to search for the shortest path to physical
happiness, televangelists will have a captive audience.

Just as "mental confusion" and "moral anarchy" seek
"truth and beauty and moral support," so too might the
poisoned soul seek an antidote. In providing it, one may
remonstrate with such a person, and tell him that
answers to life may be found elsewhere, that salvation
does not cost money, that many televangelists cater to
Americans' religious taste "with a pretty dubious product. '227 One may offer reasons as to why some televangelists may be a sham. 228 How do you know, one may
ask our believer, that Benny Hinn does in fact "cure" all
the people who claim to have been cured by him? He
never provides the viewing audience with a medical
record of the person; in fact, nothing more is discussed
about the person who is allegedly cured. Further, one
may invite this person to read news reports that expose
229

televangelists' dishonest practices.
One may cite to
23
0
televangelists' abuses from the past.
One may allude
231
to their gaudy opulence and question their sincerity.

Many viewers of evangelical television ministries
desire to regain their health, achieve financial security,

Part of the problem, as Alexis De Tocqueville aptly commented in Democracy in America, is that Americans
suffer from a "secret restlessness.

'232

Realizing that

time in this world is limited, we are "always in a hurry,
for [we] have only a limited time in which to find [worldly good things], get them, and enjoy them." 233 Sickness,
poverty or bad circumstances in life may prevent us
from achieving our worldly goals. 234 Thus, we seek a
quick assurance from God that our apparent failures
here will not have been for naught. The next world
holds a promise of eternal life. Televangelists fill the
gap here, convincing vulnerable souls that salvation is
guaranteed if they repent and accept Jesus Christ as
their savior. Throwing in a little cash to the ministry
does not hurt. After all, the Bible commands tithing.
But as seen in this Note, the marketplace of ideas
need not be captive to any single command.
Government regulation of televangelists, by any means
attempted, may be destined to fail-but in the market-
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place of ideas the people, not the government, are the
ultimate arbiters. People who disagree with televangelists' tactics should speak out, loudly and clearly. In the
meantime, while the free exchange continues, the same
First Amendment that lends the best defense against

1 I Timothy 6:3-10 (King James) (emphasis in original).

Though fictional, the preceding account is the format for a
well-known televangelist who will remain unnamed. Nothing
in this Note should be read as an accusation of criminal activity against any individual.
2

3 See Guy H. Brooks, Comment, Televangelism and the Federal

Communications Commission: To Regulate or Retreat, 91 Dick.
L. Rev. 553, 553 n.1 (1986).
4 I have followed the four classifications suggested by Brooks,
id. at 574-80, and added a fifth one (talk-shows) based on my
own viewing of religious programming on cable television.

5 This is by no means an exhaustive list. Many more televangelists, who buy time in the two major networks, exist.
6 For general information on this network, visit CBNnow.com
Christian Broadcasting Network, at http://www.cbn.org (last
visited Feb. 13, 2000).
7 For general information on this network, visit Welcome to
TBN: The Largest Christian Television Network in the World,
at http://www.tbn.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2000). Affiliated
with this is another network called the All American Network.
8 See Stephen Senn, The Prosecution of Religious Fraud, 17
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 325, 329-30 (1990) (describing a televangelist's practice of targeting susceptible people). These observations are also based on my extensive viewing of televangelist
programming---on cable channels 15 (TBN) and 21 (CBN) in
Nashville, Tennessee-as part of my research for this Note.
9 Luke 15:4, 10 (King James). See also "Parable of the Prodigal
Son," Luke 15:12-32 (King James).
10 See Jonathan Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers:
Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation, 29
Win. & M. L. Rev. 441, 447-48 (1988).
11 For example, TBN conducted a series of fundraisers to fund
their production of The Omega Code, a motion picture released
in October 15, 1999. Jerry Falwell asked viewers to help him
raise $2.5 million to help build a new hall at Liberty University.
CBN's 700 Club usually asks for money to support their relief
missions. TBN and CBN also ask for support to keep the networks operating. Again, these statements are based on my
viewing of TBN and CBN.

12 700 Club (TBN television broadcast, Jan. 21, 2000). Pat
Robertson challenged the audience to raise $275,000 during a
30-minute challenge. The goal was exceeded by $49,000.
13 See 1999 Contributions: $190.16 Billion by Source of
at
Contribution,
http://www.aafrc.org/images/graphics/chartl.jpg (last visited
Feb. 2, 2001) . This represented an 8.2% increase in donations
at
Release,
Press
AAFRC
See
1998.
from
http://www.aafrc.org/press3.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
Donations to religious institutions "[have] historically been the
area to which Americans donate the most." Id.

televangelism also requires that we "put up with, and
235
€
even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."
This Note is dedicated to my mother, Maria Teresa
Borrego, and my grandmother,Ernestina Ramos Ruiz
(1922-1996).

14

See id.

15 Id.; see also Giving 1999: Contributions Received by Type of
Recipient Organization, at http://www.aafrc.org/images/graphics/chart2.jpg (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Taggart, No. 92-6468, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1067 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bakker, 925
F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Grant, 933 F Supp. 610 (N.D.
Tex. 1996). Cf. SEC v. Deyon, 977 F. Supp. 510 (D. Me. 1997)
(finding that a televangelist violated the 1933 Securities Act,
and imposing a fine for the violation).

See. e.g., Laura Watt, Crusade Lures Seekers, Protesters:
Televangelist Packs Coliseum While Pickets Declare Him
Fraud, Denv. Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 28, 1999, at 4A;
Jennifer Harper, Celebrities' Falls Rarely Prove Fatal to Public
Opinion: America Usually Forgives, Forgets, Wash. Times, Jan.
17, 1997, at A2; John O'Brien, Stage Set for Televangelist's
Investment-Fraud Trial, Chi. Tribune, Aug. 22, 1997, at 10;
Alberta Lindsey, First You Pay, Then He Prays for Healing:
Donations Before 'Miracles' at Local Benny Hinn Crusade,
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1996, at B1; Evangelist
Pleads Guilty, Houston Chron., Nov. 23, 1995, at 32. See also
NPR Weekend Saturday (radio broadcast, May 9, 1998) (reportTrinity
ing on televangelist watchdog organization
Foundation); CNN Impact (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 23,
1997) (exploring Benny Hinn's ministry, finances, and faith
healings).
17

18

See infra notes 45-103 and accompanying text.

19 See infra notes 104-41 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 142-73 and accompanying text.
21 "Fraud," when used in this Note, means to make "a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by
false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to
deceive another.. . ." Black's Law Dictionary 660 (6th ed. 1990).
The representation must be capable of being proved false by
means of experience (that is, empirically). "Religious" and "religion" shall comprise the subjective notions and beliefs of the
person making the statement, without taking into account any
objective criteria, and without considering any established religions of the world. I make "religion" into a purely subjective
notion, incapable of being defined, because "there is no essence
of religion, no single features that all religions have in common
.... " George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the
Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 Geo. L.J. 1519, 1565
(1983) (arguing that attempts to define religion for constitutional purposes are unsatisfactory and misguided). But see
Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of
Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Religion in U.S.
Constitutional Law, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 49, 92 nn.10-12, 14 (1999)
(reviewing law review material in which authors define "religion" for constitutional purposes). Fraud shall not include any
claims relating to a Supreme Being, to religious doctrine, or to
religious belief. But cf. Senn, supra note 8, at 326-28. In other
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words, "religious fraud" shall be considered a contradiction in
terms.
See Jeffrey K. Hadden, Policing the Religious Airwaves: A
Case of Market Place Regulation, 8 B.YU. J. Pub. L. 393, 400
(1994).
22

23

Id. at 401.

24

Id. at 400.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 401.

Hadden, supra note 22, at 401. In addition the newly created radio networks, like NBC and CBS, also restricted access to
religious preachers on their stations. Id. at 401-02. Only one
network, the Mutual Broadcasting Network (Mutual), accepted
paid religious broadcasters, but this did not occur until 1935.
Id. at 402. In 1942, however, Mutual reversed itself, announcing that it would not allow on-air solicitation of funds from
audiences. Id. As a result, this forced many religious broadcasters off the air.
27

Id. at 403. The NRB is one of the more influential and sophisticated lobbying associations in Washington, D.C. See id. at
406, 416 n.41.
28

29

Id. at 403-04.

Id. at 404. See also Network Programming Inquiry, Report
and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960). For a
discussion of the FCC's "public interest" standard, see infra
notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
See Hadden, supra note 22, at 405.

32 See Jerrold M. Starr, Signal Degradation, Am. Prospect, Aug.
14, 2000.
33 See Patrice Apodaca, Southland: Television's Bible Belt, L.A.

Times, Jan. 12, 1998, at Al7.
34 Id. Obviously, a religious broadcaster need not be located in

Southern California to be successful. Pat Robertson's CBN, for
example, is based in Virginia.
35 Ted Parks, Poll Finds the Religious Aren't Reliious TV Fans,
Austin Am.-Statesman, Feb. 19, 2000.
36 See id.
37

Id.

38 See id.
39 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Const. amend. I, cl. 1.

"U.S.

40 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890) (upholding

the conviction of Beason, a Mormon, who was convicted of
polygamy). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 30304 (1940) ("[The First Amendment] embraces two conceptsfreedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society . .

42 In this light, a court went as far as listing factors to be considered in determining whether someone's beliefs were "religious" for purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
"RFRA". The factors included beliefs in ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs, moral or ethical systems, and external signs
such as the existence of a prophet, writings, rituals, holidays, or
ministers. See United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494,
1502-03 (D. Wyo. 1995). However, the Supreme Court determined that RFRA was unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks the
power to define substantive constitutional rights under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
13 See Turley, supra note 10, at 469. After the FCC revoked
Scott's broadcasting license, he "simply bought time on other
religious stations and continued his programming." Id.
44 See id. at 477-93.

45 322 U.S. 78 (1944).

30

31

(holding that Scientology was a bona fide religion and, consequently, its activities regarding an electronic measuring device
in the practice of Scientology could not be examined under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). But see United States v. Article
or Device "Hubbard Electrometer", 333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C.
1971) (holding that the Scientology writings, secular in nature,
distributed with the device contained false unqualified scientific claims and, thus, were "labeling' within the meaning of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).

").

41 See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409
F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969)

46 See Senn, supra note 8, at 333.
47 This was a divided 5-4 decision. The dissent was particularly fractured. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for three dissenters,
explicitly approved the "good faith belief' charge to the jury, and
considered the issue waived by defendants because they did not
raise an objection at trial. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 91 (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting). Accordingly, he would have reinstated the guilty
verdict reached by the District Court. Id. at 92. Justice
Jackson, on the contrary, dissented for completely different reasons. He opined that no difference exists when one is asked to
judge between the truth of a belief and the sincerity of the belief
with which one holds it. Id. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, he would have dismissed the indictment. Id. at 95.
48 Id. at 79. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1999) ("Whoever, having
devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose
of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article.. .places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which
it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
'9This gentleman, in spite of his many influential "alter egos,"
was dead at the time of the indictment. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 79-80.
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Id. at 80.

53 Id.
54 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81.
55 Id. For instance, the defendants claimed Jesus had appeared

to them and dictated the works upon which the I Am movement
was founded. Id.
56

Id.

57 Id.

The judge continued: "If these defendants did not
believe.. .that Jesus came down and dictated, or that Saint
Germain came down and dictated, did not believe the things
that they wrote, the things that they preached, but used the
mail for the purpose of getting money, the jury should find them
guilty." Id. at 81-82. The actual charge to the jury reiterated the
above admonition. Id. at 82.
58

59 Id. at 83.
60 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88.
61 Id. at 86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728
(1872)).
62

Id. at 86-87.

63

See e.., United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); United States v. Rasheed,
663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982);
Anderson v. Worldwide Church of God, 661 F. Supp. 1400 (D.
Minn. 1987). Additionally, the sincerity of belief test had been
used prior to Ballard in other "religious fraud" cases. See. e.g.,
Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1924); New v. United
States, 245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917); Post v. United States, 135 F.
1 (5th Cir. 1905).

proof); Benedict Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise 195
(R.H.M. Elwes trans., Dover Books 1951) (1677) (drawing the
"absolute conclusion that the Bible must not be accommodated
to reason, nor reason to the Bible.").
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 89 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); id. at 95 ("I
do not doubt that religious leaders may be convicted of fraud for
making false representations on matters other than faith or
experience, as for example if one represents that funds are
being used to construct a church when in fact they are being
used for personal purposes.") (Jackson, J., dissenting).
70

This presents a serious dilemma for a trier of fact. If some of
the jurors are members of the defendant's faith, they are probably going to believe that the defendant has a sincere belief in
what she believes. Conversely, the jurors who are not members
of the defendant's faith may automatically dismiss the defendant's beliefs as ludicrous. No matter how the jury is composed,
then, the defendant may not have an impartial and fair jury.
71

A religion is only labeled as non-traditional by judging it
against the standard of "traditional" and "accepted" religions.
This is obviously a culturally relative term.
72

73 322 U.S. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
74

Id.

75 See, e.g., United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir.

1983); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983). See
generally Charles J. Ogletree, Reverend Moon and the Black
Hebrews: Constitutional Protection of a Defendant's Religion in
Criminal Cases, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 191 (1987).
76

See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93-94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

77 111 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997).
78

Id. at 723.

Frazee v. Illinois Dep't. of Employment Sec., 489
S
,
U.S. 829 (1989); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 163 (1970);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 333, 185 (1965) (applying the
sincerity of belief test in a "conscientious objector" case).

79 Id. at 724

See, e.g., Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding the Immigration Judge's questioning of "respondent's claim to religion and membership in the Jehovah's
Witness"); Patrick v. Lefevre, 745 F2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984); Childs
v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983); International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1981); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409
E2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Meyers, 906 F. Supp. at 1507 (holding that while defendant's "Church of Marijuana" beliefs may
be sincerely held, his sincerity was not enough to rise to the
level of a "religion" for purposes of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act); Williams v. Bright, 658 N.YS.2d 910, 915
(N.Y App. Div. 1997) (holding that the jury may consider the
plaintiff's belief in religious tenets in a negligence action).

81 Id. at 729 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).

64

65

66

Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

67

Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

68

Id.

For a discussion on the impossibility of proofs of God's existence using reason, see generally Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason 500-24 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., St. Martin's
Press 1965) (1787) (showing that God's existence can be proved
in only three ways, and demonstrating the impossibility of each
69

Id. at 727 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting the IJ's oral
decision).
80

Mejia-Paiz, 111 F.3d at 729 (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976)).
82

83

Id.

84

925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996)

85

Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).

86

Id. at 679.

87 Id. Cf. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
88

925 S.W.2d at 679.

89 That is, the trier of fact could determine if Tilton in fact read,

touched and prayed over the prayer requests-regardless of
their ultimate desired outcome. See id. at 695-96 (Enoch, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that whether religious conduct amounted
to fraud may be a proper inquiry for the jury). If Tilton did not
pray over them, he did not keep his promise. If followers based
their donations specifically on this fact, they could recover
under a fraud theory, or under a restitutionary claim. However,
they could not recover if they based their donations in the hope

f mtv n te
that God would heal them because Tilton prayed over their
prayer requests. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
90 See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W2d 672, 679 (Tex. 1996).
91 However, if a person offered a reason, based on religious doctrine or belief, for not performing a concrete act, a charge of
fraud could not proceed based on such a statement. For example, suppose Ballard had said that he had to go to San Francisco
to pray for Joe because that would be the only way in which God
could heal him. Based on this, Joe made a donation to Ballard.
If Ballard did not to go to San Francisco as he promised, Joe
could allege that Ballard made a misrepresentation of a matter
of fact by false allegations, which intended to deceive Joe. See
supra note 22. But if Ballard countered that God had told him,
at the last minute, that he could not go, the concrete act could
not be a misrepresentation of a matter of fact because it is ultimately based on a statement of religious doctrine or belief and
cannot be proved false. Following Tilton, a court would conclude that it is irrelevant whether Ballard made the statement
honestly or in bad faith. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 679.
92

Id. Cf. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92-94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (2000)).
103

104 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i) (2000).
105

Id. § 307.

106

Id. § 303(m).

107

Id. § 312.

108

See FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 289 (1954).

109 Section 1343 states "Whoever, having devised or intending
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).

93 See Tilton, 925 S.W2d at 679. The court quoted from Tilton's

110 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (2000). This subsection also allows

mail solicitations: "I feel the Holy Spirit prompting me to challenge you in the name of Jesus to send $100 right now ....
I
challenge you to prove Him now with a $100 offering to seed
into the work of God and help us carry this anointed Elijah ministry .... " Id.

for the revocation of a license if the licensee violates 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1304 (broadcasting lottery information) and 1364 (broadcasting obscene, indecent or profane language). Id.

94

Id.

95 Cf. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Court here held that "the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' Id. at 879 (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). Thus,
because Oregon law proscribes the use of peyote, the state could
deny claimants unemployment benefits for work-related misconduct based on the use of peyote for religious reasons. Id. at
890. The Court also concluded that the test developed in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), in which the government may not penalize someone for exercising their religious
practices unless it is justified by a compelling governmental
interest, id. at 402-03, is inapplicable to criminal laws. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
96

97 Id. at 877 (emphasis added) (citing Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-

88).
98 Suppose, for example, a person believes that God has three
heads. If I think that is a false belief, I will doubt that anyone
in his right mind could believe that God is a three-headed
being. I would certainly question the sincerity of the person's
belief in the three-headedness of God.
99 Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 679.
100 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
244 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
101 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 ("Prosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious persecution.") (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).

nl See. e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303 ("Except as otherwise provided in
this Act, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires...."). Although Congress
does not uniformly use the term "public interest" throughout
the Communications Act, the FCC's guiding principle in granting or denying licenses has been known as the "public interest
standard." Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public
Interest" Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 605, 608 n.8 (1998) (tracing the history of the FCC's
public interest standard).
112 See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596
(1981); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (holding that
the public interest standard is not unconstitutionally vague);
FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) (describing the
public interest standard as the "touchstone" of FCC authority).
See Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 111, at 615 (stating
that the "public interest [encompassed] four requirements: (1)
'sustaining' unsponsored programs; (2) local live programs; (3)
programming devoted to the discussion of local public issues;
and (4) the elimination of advertising excesses.") (footnote omitted).
113

114 Id. The list included programs for children, religious programs, educational programs, news programs, sports programs,
and service to minority groups, among others. Id.

115 Id. at 616. Under the marketplace approach, "regulation is
viewed as necessary only when the marketplace clearly fails to
protect the public interest, but not when there is only a potential for failure." Id.
116 See Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, 14
F.C.C. Rcd. 21633, 21634 (1999).
117 Id. Because the FCC is considering whether to adopt new
public interest guidelines in light of the current transition from
analog to digital television, it has asked the public and broadcasters to offer their views on "how best to implement the public interest" during the change. Id. at 21637.
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118 See, e.g., Faith Center, Inc., 82 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); Gilbert
Broad. Corp., 68 F.C.C.2d 170 (1977); United Television Co.,
Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 698, aff'd, 514 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1974), petition for license renewal denied, 55 F.C.C.2d 416 (1975); Bible
Moravian Church, Inc., 28 F.C.C.2d 15 (1971); BrandywineMain Line Radio, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 565 (1971); United Tel. Co.,
55 F.C.C.2d 416 (1971); Independent Broad. Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 72
(1949); Young People's Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel,
6 F.C.C. 178 (1938). See also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969); King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C.
Cir 1974); Hartford Communications Comm'n v. FCC, 467 F.2d
408 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Immaculate Conception Church v. FCC, 320 F.2d 795 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904 (1963); Trinity Methodist
Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).

119 See, e.g., James Albert, Federal Investigation of Video
Evangelism: The FCC Probes the PTL Club, 33 Okla. L. Rev.
782 (1980) (examining court and FCC precedent which established the Commission's jurisdiction over Bakker's organization).
120

See Brooks, supra note 3, at 572.

121

Id. at 570.

122

Id. at 571.

123

Id.

132

WQED I, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at *67-69 (footnote 81 included).

See, e.g., Pulling God's License, Am. Enter., Mar. 1, 2000;
FCC Follies: Fairness Returns too Late for WQED, Pitt. PostGazette, Feb. 5, 2000, at A10.
133

See WQED II, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at *5 n.1 (Furchtgott-Roth,
Comm'r, concurring).
134

Jerry Falwell, Special Victory Report (discussing the FCC's
decision to vacate WQED I's additional guidance portion of the
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135

136
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1076 (1984).
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I, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. at *112 (Powell & Furchtgott-Roth, Comm'rs,
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vent televangelist fraud relating to the solicitation of funds. Id.
at 606-09. Unfortunately, the author does not specify what kind
of conduct the statute would cover, only stating that it "should
prohibit deceptive and unfair conduct or advertising in the
solicitation of funds." Id. at 608. This only begs the question.
As his proposal stands now, it could cover televangelist solicitations based on "concrete acts," or solicitations based on "religious doctrine or belief." Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 679; cf. Ballard,
322 U.S. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Bringing the former
within the meaning of "deceptive and unfair conduct" would be
allowed, but not the latter, for the reasons stated in this Note.

See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 731-32 (4th Cir.
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See, e.g., Unmasked: Exposing the Secrets of Deception
(TLC television broadcast Jan 21, 2001), which featured televangelist Rev. Peter Popoff, a so-called faith healer with an act
very similar to Benny Hinn's. Popoff claimed that by speaking
to God he could identify the attendees' afflictions and heal
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information God "gave him." The program featured the captured audio of Popoff's wife, who knew so much about the attendees because they filled out and turned in "prayer cards" before
as they came into the auditorium. His dishonest practices were
uncovered in 1986.
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FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The other purposes include proof of
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conviction on the ground of undue prejudice. See FED. R. EVID.
403.
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163 See Sawyer, 90 F.3d at 120. Cf. Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC,
827 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (denying a preliminary
injunction that would have prohibited a rebroadcast of
PrimeTime Live's original program dealing with Tilton's ministry).

164 See Sawyer, 90 .3d at 120. PrimeTime Live broadcast a
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172 See Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1993). For
the lighter side of suits by televangelists, see Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that televangelist
Falwell could not recover damages for infliction of emotional
distress as a result of an ad parody, which claimed that
Falwell's "first time" was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse).

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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189 Id. at 1886. In the present hypothetical there are no less
restrictive alternatives. All other alternatives, in order to regulate televangelists, would have to be content-based. Contentneutral regulations, such as time, place or manner regulations
would fail to address the "evil" the legislature wished to remedy because the putative evil here consists in words.

For an additional proposed solution, see Nicholas Barborak,
Comment, Saving the World. One Cadillac at a Time; What Can
be done When a Religious or Charitable Organization Commits
Solicitation Fraud?, 33 Akron L. Rev. 577 (2000). The author
proposes to enact a federal deceptive sales practices law to pre173
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(7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.)
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leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at
home, battery and rape on the streets. In the language of the
legislature, "pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex
which differentially harms women ....Yet this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech. All of these unhappy effects depend on mental intermediation. Pornography
affects how people see the world, their fellows, and social relations. If pornography is what pornography does, so is other
speech.").
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See id. at 330 ("Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, reporters' biases-these and many more influence the
culture and shape our socialization. None is directly answerable
by more speech, unless that speech too finds its place in the
popular culture. Yet all is protected as speech, however insidious. Any other answer leaves the government in control of all of
the institutions of culture, the great censor and director of
which thoughts are good for us.").
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U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1.

Church Of The Lukumi Babalu Ave, Inc. v. City Of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993). If, on the contrary, the regulation was content-neutral and of general application, it would raise no free
exercise problem. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
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Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533. "A law lacks facial neutrality if it
refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context." Id.
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Id.

197 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).

198 See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 545 ("We conclude, in sum, that
each of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the city's governmental
interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.").
Id. at 541-42 (quoting citizens' comments during a Hialeah
City Council meeting where the ordinance was discussed).
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Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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See. e.g., Robert Post, Symposium on Law in the Twentieth
Century: Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2353, 2355-56 (2000); Theodore
Y. Blumoff, 1999-2000 Oliver Wendel Holmes Devise
Symposium: The Marketplace of Ideas in Cyberspace, 51
Mercer L. Rev. 817, 821 (2000); Todd G. Hartman, The
Marketplace vs. The Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges
to Internet Commerce, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 419, 427 (1999);
David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition, 95 Yale L.J. 857, 882 (1986). Cf. Murray
Dry, The First Amendment Freedoms, Civil Peace and the
Quest for Truth, 15 Const. Commentary 325, 348 (1998).
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202 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.").
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Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Id. For an account of the evolution and development of his
argument, see Cole, supra note 201, at 879-87. For the philo204

sophical origins of Holmes' argument, see Dry, supra note 201,
at 329-43.
205 Hartman, supra note 201, at 427.

206 See id. at 427-28; see also Cole, supra note 201, at 900 ("The
market's test of truth gives way to every day exchange of the
marketplace. Value lies not so much in the final result as in the
process of exchange.").
207 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But cf.
Cole, supra note 201, at 886 ("Grounded not so much on the efficiency of the economic market as on the 'imperfect knowledge'
of participants and overseers alike... Holmes' market nevertheless relies on an 'invisible hand."').
208 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
209 See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55

(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[I]f there is any principle of the
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we
hate.").
210 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974); see also Hustler
Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51.
211 For example, the desired response under this model if the
Ku Klux Klan decided to march through a Jewish community
would be to have a counter-demonstration to compete with and
thwart the effect of the Klan's march.
212 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
("This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature... and
necessarily protects the right to receive it."). Justice Brennan
agreed with this view, claiming that the right to receive information is "a fundamental right" because it is necessary for the
proper operation of the marketplace of ideas. Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers." Id. (emphasis added).
213

Cole, supra note 201, at 894.

214

Id.
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A fully free marketplace of ideas does not exist today, as
evinced by the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, because not all speech is protected. See supra notes 18186 and accompanying text. In addition to these unprotected
classes of speech, commercial speech may also be regulated, so
long as the law meets the test set out under 44 Liquourmart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Nevertheless, the
marketplace theory is "alive and well." Blumoff, supra note 201,
at 822. It has been applied to recent cases dealing with the
Internet. See Hartman, supra note 201, at 441-48 (discussing
three recent cases in which courts adopted the
marketplace theory).
216

217 Several commentators have criticized and attacked the marketplace of ideas theory. See. e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Only
Words (1993); Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace
of Ideas Fails, 31 Val. U.L. Rev. 951 (1997); Richard Delgado,
Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Reulating Racist Speech on

f'mtvn te
the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original
members to express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."); see also Boyscouts of America v. Dale,
120 S. Ct. 2446, 2451 (2000).

Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L.J. 1; Richard
Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133
(1982). They have also offered their own alternatives. See, e.g.,
MacKinnon, supra, at 98-103, 107-08 (equality theory); Post,
supra note 201, at 2367-68 (participatory theory); Brietzke,
supra, at 967 ("market-failure" theory); Alexander Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948) (selfgovernment theory). Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (creating the basis of
self-government theory); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 26 (1971) (limiting protected speech to explicitly "political" speech under a
self-government theory). Some critics, taking Justice Holmes'
metaphor literally, argue that the free trade in ideas has suffered a "market-failure." Edwin Baker, Of Course. More Than
Words, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1187 (1994) (reviewing
Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words); Brietzke, supra, at 96163. For instance, with a monopolistic media controlling what
information is diffused, with the ignorance of disfavored viewpoints, and with the lack of access of minorities and other disSee
enfranchised groups, the marketplace of ideas fails.
Brietzke, supra, at 962, 965 n.49 (citing Edwin Baker, Scope of
the First amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964,
981-82 (1978)). The ideas fail to flow freely among all members
of the marketplace. Further, other critics argue that members
who are targets of speech may not have the means (economic,
educational or otherwise) to respond. See id. at 963-64. Another
objection is that ideas already established as "true," like equality, may still be subject to attack by proponents of inequality.
Mackinnon, supra, at 106. The solutions that critics of the marketplace model offer amount to censorship. Speech that tends
to silence other viewpoints (that is, that causes "restraints of
trade" or "monopolization," Brietzke, supra, at 967), or speech
that perpetuates inequality, Mackinnon, supra, at 102, may be
banned. Examples of this include racist speech, Brietzke,
supra, at 967-68, and pornography, Mackinnon, supra, at 102.
For example, Mackinnon argues that pornography should be
regulated. She raises a sophistical distinction between what
the speech says and what it does. She justifies regulation of
pornography, for example, on what it does, not on what it says.
Mackinnon, supra, at 23, 25. This does not distinguish pornography from any other speech, as all speech may be characterized as "doing" something. For instance, intolerant religious
speech may be an exercise of power and contribute to cause
physical harm to those who do not believe in it. This speech,
like pornography, would contribute to "enforcing inequality."
Id. at 102. Would this, then, justify the banning of virulent religious speech? Under her argument the answer is yes, in order
to achieve equality. See id. at 106-07. Her argument would
"permit the banning ... of material that incontrovertibly contains value in the marketplace of ideas." Baker, supra, at 1191;
cf. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329-30. Under Mackinnon's argument,
pornography will not be the only category of banned speech;
indubitably others will follow. Closely tied to this argument is
that pornography is of "low value" and may be regulated
because "the harm of the speech outweighs its value."
Mackinnon, supra, at 91. However, as Judge Easterbrook suggests, pornographic speech is quite powerful, having the ability
to influence society's views on women. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at
329. This Mackinnon does not deny. Indeed, Only Words convincingly shows why pornography harms women and creates
inequality in society. But, one may ask, if pornography was of
such low value, how could it have the power it has to influence
individuals? Were Mackinnon's approach adopted and declared
valid, "governments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.

See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ("one important manifestation
of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak
may also decide 'what not to say"')
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Of course, technically speaking a rejection of a particular
point of view is an "action," for it constitutes an act.
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Conversely, the positive response may come first. For
instance, after the press brought to light the misconduct that
Jim Bakker engaged in related to his PTL ministry (the positive
response), viewers effected the negative response.
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Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988)
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234 Cf. id. at 537 ("Apart from the good he has, he thinks of a
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he does not hurry. This thought fills him with distress, fear,
and regret and keeps his mind continually in agitation, so that
he is always changing his plans and his abode.").
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